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Abstract: The great irony of our information infrastructure is that while there is an
immense variety of data, it flows through a single channel. Therefore, individuals
are forced to evaluate the safety of the web sites they are viewing on the same
channel that may be controlled by a malicious party. How can a consumer obtain the
information necessary to discriminate between good and bad resources? The
solution to this particular signaling problem is to create mechanisms that are
embedded in the communication but beyond the control of the web site. Net Trust is
an application that informs the web-browsing experience with an individually
tailored, easy-to-use, thoroughly tested interface. Net Trust is focused on
authenticating web sites to individual users instead of authenticating individual users
to web sites. This paper describes the theory, motivation, and interaction behind Net
Trust.
* The author is an Associate Professor in the School of Informatics at Indiana University,
Bloomington, Indiana.
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I. INTRODUCTION
When on the Internet, individuals are susceptible to a vast number
of risks, which include unreliable software, malicious web sites, and
old-fashioned merchant fraud schemes disguised in new electronic
trappings. There are both centralized and distributed mechanisms to
assist individual users to detect malicious actors and protect
themselves on the network. Empowering online communities by
enabling peer production of security and privacy information is critical
to helping individuals protect themselves online.
In this paper, I describe a system that not only allows individuals
to easily access and annotate their own histories, but also to share
those histories with a self-selected social network. Net Trust uses both
socially generated information and centralized data to enable informed
decision-making about the web sites users visit. By integrating both
social networking and centralized information, the system provides
both personal histories and centralized information sources to the
individual user in one simple interface. It is an application that
provides information for the web-browsing experience with an
individually tailored, easy-to-use, repeatedly tested interface. Net
Trust is focused on authenticating web sites to individual users instead
of authenticating individual users to web sites. This paper describes
the theory, motivation, and interaction behind Net Trust. Unlike
commercial social browsing systems, Net Trust limits the distribution
of identifiable personal histories to user-defined social networks. The
goal is to enable users to control access to their personal information.
II. GOAL
Net Trust is a security technology designed to defeat masquerade
attacks and to reduce the efficacy of Internet-based fraud by providing
source authenticating information to the individual user. Masquerade
attacks seek to lead the victim to believe that the perpetrating
malicious entity is really an entity the victim trusts. Ironically, this
type of attack is enabled by the lack of information on the Internet. A
phishing attack is an example of this kind of attack. Phishing is
difficult to prevent because it preys directly on the absence of source
identification information online. For example, a user receives an
email communication from a sender who purports to be the user's
bank. The sender is actually running a malicious phishing site. The
link embedded in the email leads the user to a site that is nearly
identical to the legitimate site the user has visited in the past. This
type of attack is very difficult for the user to detect. Simultaneously,
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there is very little that the legitimate institution can do online to
demonstrate that it is the original and not a masquerade site.
Phishing, botnets' and other Internet-based fraud schemes continue to
be a substantial and growing problem.2  The Federal Trade
Commission reported that in 2004, 53% of all fraud complaints were
Internet related; as recently as five years ago, Internet-based fraud was
a rare phenomenon. The Pew Internet & American Life Project has
noted that 68% of Internet users surveyed were concerned about
criminals obtaining their credit card information, while 84% were
worried about the compromise of other personal data.3  Net Trust
identifies sites that identify themselves as popular banking sites as
masquerades based both on the information from the FDIC and
information from peers.
A second type of attack that could be decreased by Net Trust is a
"zombie attack." A zombie attack occurs when a web site downloads
malicious code or exploits browser vulnerabilities to create a zombie.4
For example, a study by Microsoft using monkey spider browsers5
(browsers which spider the web but act like humans) found 752 sites
that subverted machines via browser vulnerabilities. 6  Net Trust is
1 A botnet is a group of subverted machines all controlled by the same malicious hacker. For
example, the hacker can use all the machines to send spain or to host phishing sites. The
number of machines used by the hacker is directly related to the amount of spain that can be
generated and having many hosts makes it significantly more difficult to shut down a phishing
site.
2 Federal Trade Commission: Protecting America's Consumers, "FTC Releases Top 10
Consumer Complaint Categories for 2004," FTC.gov,
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2005/02/top 102005.htm (accessed October 17, 2007).
3 Susannah Fox, "Trust and Privacy Online: Why Americans Want to Rewrite the Rules," Pew
Internet & American Life Project, http://www.pewintemet.org/ PPF/r/19/report display.asp
(accessed October 17, 2007).
4 A zombie is a machine that has come under the control of a remote party after the remote
party subverted the machine. In Voodoo cults, the zombie is the body that is enslaved by a
magician. On the Internet, the zombie is the computer that is controlled by a remote hacker.
A group of zombies controlled by the same person is a botnet.
5 A web spider climbs over all the links on the web, touching each one from a site,
backtracking, and then going to another site and repeating the process. A web spider crawls
the links in the World Wide Web as a physical spider crawls the links in a physical web.
6 y. Wang and others, "Automated Web Patrol with Strider HoneyMonkeys: Finding Web
Sites That Exploit Browser Vulnerabilities" (symposium, Network and Distributed System
Security, Internet Society, San Diego, CA, February 2, 2006) http://www.isoc.org/isoc/
conferences/ndss/06/proceedings/html/2006/papers.honeymonkeys.pdf.
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designed to integrate a list of malicious sites and inform the user of the
risks of the sites. It could even interrupt the connection with an
informational warning.
III. MOTIVATION - NET TRUST IN ACTION
Net Trust is built on the personal observations described below
combined with formal economic and information security theory.
Keeping a network secure, much like keeping a neighborhood safe,
requires the contribution of every member of a group. A potent
observation is that as the network expands, more people become
network operators. If telephone calls were switched by human
operators today, every man woman and child in America would have
to be a telephone operator. End user responsibility and control has
increased even as dialing has gone from seven to ten digits and the
proliferation of mobile devices have effectively ended universal
directory service while vastly increasing the difficulty of interaction.
The cell phone interface is much more complicated than a ten digit
pad. Cell phones enable more complex functions at the cost of
simplicity. Yet even with increased complexity, the contribution of
naive users as opposed to trained operators has increased.
The individual computer owner has the most to lose when a
computer is subverted. Attackers can take actions for which the
computer owner could be held responsible, such as downloading
copyrighted content or using the computer to implement other attacks.
Individuals also bear the cost of spyware and malware, particularly
when the malware enables financial fraud or identity theft.
8
The economics of security advances a strong argument that the
organizational incentives in a security mechanism must be aligned
with the investment required for operation of that mechanism. Many
security failures are a result of incentive misalignment. 9 The party at
risk should be the party capable of making the most effective
investment to mitigate that risk. Net Trust aligns incentives with
7 There were women who performed switching on phone networks until the nineteen sixties in
America. Even as late as nineteen eighty there were electro-mechanical switches in local
loops.
8 L. Jean Camp, Economics of Identity Theft: Avoidance, Causes and Possible Cures (New
York: Springer-Verlag, 2007).
9 Ross Anderson, "Why Information Security is Hard - An Economic Perspective," in
Proceedings of the 17th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (Washington,
D.C.: IEEE Computer Society, 2001) http://www.acsac.org/2001/papers/1l0.pdf.
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adoption in two ways. First, users control their own information rather
than paying a dot com for a service. Second, Net Trust creates an open
market for third parties supported by users or specialist groups by
including lists of safe sites provided by Site Advisor, the FDIC, or any
other software provider. Under the current system, third-party
evaluators are paid by merchants and web site owners; this presents an
inherent conflict of interest.
Information sharing is valuable because it creates incentives to
mitigate risk. Even when individuals report inaccurately, the ability to
identify and effectively deal with computer security risks increases.
10
In fact, being more informed and sharing information are correlated
with additional security investments. 1 This finding suggests that Net
Trust will not only be valuable in itself, but also may increase overall
user security awareness and investment (future research with Net Trust
includes experimenting with Net Trust users to test for the existence of
complementary investment, e.g., securing home networks).
If Net Trust generates an increased awareness among individuals,
it could also contribute to an increased awareness among firms that are
seeking customers. Currently, investment in Internet security is
arguably inadequate.2 Like firms, individuals suffer immediate costs
and future risks from a loss of information integrity. In the case of
firms, a security incident is associated with immediate loss of value. A
study of the capital market valuation of security incidents found that a
firm can lose up to 2% of its market value within two days of a
publicized incident. 13  Individuals also need mechanisms that allow
them to share information effectively. When individual users produce
10 L. A. Gordon, "An Economics Perspective on the Sharing of Information Related to
Security Breaches: Concepts and Empirical Evidence" (workshop, The Economics of
Information Security, Berkeley, CA, May 16-17, 2002)
http://www.cpppe.umd.edu/Bookstore/Documents/EconomicPerspective_05.17.02.pdf.
11 Esther Gal-Or and Anindya Ghose, "The Economic Consequences of Sharing Security
Information," in Economics of Information Security, L. Jean Camp and Stephen Lewis, eds.
(New York: Springer-Kluwer, 2004): 95-105.
12 Lawrence A. Gordon and Martin Loeb, "The Economics of Information Security
Investment," in Economics of Information Security, L. Jean Camp and Stephen Lewis, eds.
(New York: Springer-Kluwer, 2004): 105-127.
" Allan Friedman and Alessandro Acquisiti, "Cost of Privacy Breaches" (workshop, The
Economics of Information Security, Cambridge, MA, June 2-3, 2006)
http://www.heinz.cmu.edu/-acquisti/papers/acquisti-friedman-telang-privacy-breaches.pdf.
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information goods, as opposed to when firms produce information
goods, the result is called peer production.' 4
In the traditional security paradigm, security decisions are often
made for the user, without the user's knowledge, by the software on
the user's computer. For example, ActiveX and SSL16 are two
widely used programs and both use hierarchies to determine whether a
web site will be trusted by the user's browser. These commercially-
determined hierarchies give meaningful technical rights on the user's
machine to those sites approved by the technical authorities. The
extension of technical trust in these systems is made one of three ways.
First, trust may be extended by default due to the default setting on the
user's browser. Second, the extension of trust may result from the user
"agreeing" by clicking a button on a pop-up window. Or, third, trust
may be requested, again via a pop-up or a page on the requestor's site,
through difficult to read, technically detailed information (not unlike
an End User Licensing Agreement (EULA)). 17 The result is a lack of
meaningful information to guide an individual's trust decisions on the
network. In contrast, Net Trust is designed to allow users to make
socially informed choices of their own.
In many cases, the security questions that are asked by centralized
third parties are not relevant to the trust decision of the consumer at
home. The third party may certify that an individual provided valid
payment for cryptographic certification. The party might also confirm
some identity claim. The consumer at home is more concerned with
distinguishing between a reliable or reputable merchant and a recent e-
14 Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson and Paul Syverson, "Reputation in Peer-to-Peer
Anonymity Systems" (workshop, Annual Association of Computing Machinery, San Diego,
CA, June 9-12, 2003) http://www2.sims.berkeley.edu/research/conferences/
p2pecon/papers/s2-dingledine.pdf.
15 ActiveX is used to allow web sites to run particular types of code to enable particular
interactions based on a decision hierarchy that is grounded by Microsoft and the employer of
the user.
16 SSL, the secure sockets layer, is based on a hierarchy where providers of SSL certificates
sell certificates that are then recognized by the user's browser. There is little or no
information provided to the user about the decision by the certificate provider, or the
implications of the level of certificate provided.
17 An EULA is an End User Licensing Agreement. The only study of consumer use of EULAs
found that users do not usually read EULAs, and when they read them, they do not understand
them. See Nathaniel Good and others, "User Choices and Regret: Understanding Users'
Decision Process about Consensually Acquired Spyware," I/S: A Journal of Law and Policy
for the Information Society 2, no. 2 (2006): 283-344.
[Vol. 3:2
commerce entrant. The consumer may want to know if friends and
family have had positive or negative experiences with the online
merchant. An individual may vaguely remember a previous site and
want to know if a present site is the one previously visited. Third
parties cannot provide this information; they simply fail to provide
socially meaningful information and thus do not effectively inform
individual trust decisions.
Net Trust combines information from personal browsing histories,
social networks (as ratings) and third parties (as Boolean indicators).
Combined, these three sets of indicators can both provide information
to detect masquerade attacks and answer the questions about web sites
that are important to consumers.
The Figures below show the ratings that may be presented to the
user in the current version of Net Trust.
l1
Figure 1: Net Trust shows mixed ratings
F r 2NtTrsot sEwh ptoirdse r.ati
Figure 2: Net Trust shows positive ratings
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Figure 3: Net Trust shows negative ratings
Net Trust enables the integration of information from trusted
parties, not simply information from unknown third parties as is the
tradition in current security and cryptographic systems. The removal
of the word "third" in the traditional trusted third-party construct
indicates that the individual makes the final trust decision, not the
"trusted" party. There is no root that determines which parties are
18 The details of who provides the ratings and which mechanisms are used to create them are
provided in the latter portions of the paper.
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trusted. In trusted third-party systems, the browser manufacturer,
employer or other third-party determine who is a trusted party. With
Net Trust, users select trusted information providers.
The Net Trust user, not the distributor or developer, makes the
final determination of which parties are trusted. This is the functional
difference between SSL or ActiveX type security models, which the
user is provided a mechanism to place trust in an unknown third party
and Net Trust. Many of the mechanisms that enable trust and defeat
fraud off-line are social mechanisms or physical mechanisms that
cannot be re-created online.19 In contrast, parties who engage in e-
commerce are often separated geographically, temporally, and
socially.20 Consider the two companies in Figure 4 on the following
page. Both are places where one might complete a transaction. If the
two institutions were separated by meters, as opposed to an ocean, the
differences would still be obvious. The Bank of Scotland has greater
wealth, which indicates greater transactional security. The Bank of
Scotland also has a building that reflects its history.
In economic terms, the Bank of Scotland is more trustworthy and
is able to signal this quality through the construction of an impressive
fagade, its location at a prestigious address, and its highly ordered self-
presentation. Compare this to The Check Cashing Place in Racine,
Wisconsin. The fagade of The Check Cashing Place indicates high
competition, low overhead and a history no longer than the storefront
lease. Online, none of the information that is so abundant in real life
interactions is available. Geographical cues can be easily falsified but
there are few expensive addresses in the infinitely expandable domain
name system.
All domain names cost the same amount to register. Of the two
below one institution holds millions in deposits. The other is trusted
only to provide cash upon the presentation of a payment instrument.
Even the range of payment instruments available at these facilities is
not available on the Internet. Online, any payment requires
transmission of information that can be reused by the receiving
merchant for fraud, e.g. a credit card number. Any transaction on the
Internet requires trust that would be worthy of the Bank of Scotland,
19 Jens Riegelsberger and Angela Sasse, "Trustbuilders and Trustbusters: The Role of Trust
Cues in Interfaces to e-Commerce Applications," in IFIP Conference Proceedings (Deventer,
Neherlands: Kluwer, 2001): 17-30; Helen Nissenbaum, "Securing Trust Online: Wisdom or
Oxymoron?" Boston University Law Review 81, no. 3 (2001): 635-664.
20 Sonja Grabner-Kraeuter, "The Role of Consumers' Trust in Online-Shopping," Journal of
Business Ethics 39 (2002): 43-50; Ravi Kalakota and Andrew B. Whinston, Readings in
Electronic Commerce: SPHIGS Software (Boston: Addison-Wesley, 1996): 251-282.
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but that information must be provided with less information about
location, stability, and history than that presented by The Check
Cashing Place.
Figure 4: Comparing financial institutions in the physical realm
Financial Services in Scotland, UK Financial Services in Racine, WI, US
Online, these virtual sites would be distinguished only by the web
site design, domain name, and corresponding SSL certificates.
Imagine that The Check Cashing Place renamed itself BankScotland.
It could purchase any domain name, regardless of its registered
business name. BankScotland and ScotlandBank, for example, were
both available at the time this paper was written. An Internet user
could easily confuse the two. In contrast, brick and mortar businesses
can invest in physical infrastructure and expensive physical addresses
to differentiate their prestige, customer service and reliability. To
emphasize the point, consider the two pages below. The first image is
provided to online customers by Sun Trust Bank. The second image
was captured from a phishing attack that used a subverted computer at
the business school at Columbia University controlled by a criminal
entity (quite possibly on another continent). 1
21 Tyler Moore and Richard Clayton, "An Empirical Analysis of the Current State of Phishing
Attack and Defense" (workshop, The Economics of Information Security, Pittsburgh PA, June
7-8,2007).
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Figure 5: Comparing putative financial institutions online
Sun Trust Sun Phish
The information infrastructure should have the most possible
information about a source. However, it is easier to differentiate two
types of stores (e.g., discount and prestige) offline than it is to
distinguish between a bank and a criminal hideout online. This is
because the possible sources of information, the number of channels of
information, are greater offline than online. Online information is also
easier to falsify. Even some things that don't seem notable off-line,
such as background noise, odor, and number of other customers in a
store cannot be verified or transmitted online. Thus the types, amount,
and validity of information on the information infrastructure is more
difficult to evaluate than the information online. In the figure above,
the validity of the online information is difficult to judge. Security
experts immediately recognize a false site as do many users, based on
the absence of the icon indicating a SSL certificate. However, these
cues can be falsified. My own web site (www.ljean.com) has as its
icon a lock that indicates a secure site on Internet Explorer. But this is
only a conceit, there is no corresponding security.
The goal of Net Trust is to enable individuals to make better
decisions about online resources by allowing individuals to use their
own information, rather than forcing them to depend on the
information provided by remote third parties. Net Trust makes these
signals unique to each user and is more secure than easy to copy visual
cues (e.g., the TRUSTe COPA seal or the Better Business Bureau seal)
22 1 was curious if this misdirection would work, and would continue to work with IE. It
appears to at this time.
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and more understandable than certificates. Net Trust is expandable
and can be modified or used by other programmers without charge.2 3
IV. PEER SIGNALING N RESOURCE ALLOCATION
The literature on peer production was popularized by open code
and peer-to-peer music sharing systems. 24 Peer production has been
found to have many advantages over firm-based production. Peer
production changes the modularity, granularity and cost of integration
of a produced good; it shifts the production costs to those most able
and willing to bear them.
The peer production of information in Net Trust is highly modular.
The granularity of Net Trust's implicit rating system is the URL. The
use of social networks to group people affords Net Trust many
advantages. Although limiting the radius of contacts from which
information can be gleaned vastly constrains the total quantity of
information, the smaller egocentric network of each individual is
composed of individuals the user trusts.25 Users will trust themselves
not to invite a malicious actor into their personal networks and are less
likely to trust the judgment of friends. Trust may be transitive, as a
commonly cited model indicates, so long as it is within a finite
radius.26 A smaller network, both numerically and socially, has a
smaller chance of containing a malicious node. A common computer
science practice is to require individuals to create explicit numerical
weights that reflect how much each node trusts their neighbors. The
Net Trust model requires no such calculation; personal selection is a
Boolean indication of trust.
A decrease in free riding is a possible outcome of a small network.
Within a small social network, the incentive to cheat or free ride is less
severe than in a larger anonymous system. Abusers of a small social
23 Net Trust is distributed under a modified BSD license, meaning that the code is available if
someone wants to improve it, alter it, or distribute it. All that is required is that credit is given
to the original creators. Most code is distributed in a form that makes reuse impossible. For
more details on licensing see Lawrence Lessig, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace (New
York: Basic Books, 2000).
24 Yochai Benkler, "Coase's Penguin, or Linux and the Nature of the Firm," Yale Law Journal
112, no. 3 (2002): 435.
25 These individuals are trusted in the social sense and not in the cryptographic provable sense.
26 Thomas Beth, Malte Borcherding, and Birgit Klein, "Valuation of Trust in Open Networks,"
Lecture Notes in Computer Science 875 (1994): 3-18.
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network will benefit less from unfriendly behavior because there are
fewer known people to damage; (unlike with a centralized
recommender), the incentives are further reduced because each
member shares social ties with their immediate neighbors. The use of
implicit data means that free riding, or having the system passively
obtain information from others without generating any information,
will still be an issue in Net Trust. When the alternative is non-use,
free-riding should be encouraged.
There are practical advantages to a small network. The number of
communication links scales as a square of the total network size; a
smaller network decreases overall traffic.2 7  Obtaining the same
outcome with less traffic is more efficient. In addition to scaling up
more easily, the fact that only a limited number of individuals are
needed for the system to work means that Net Trust can grow without
waiting for a critical mass. Finally, early usability tests indicate that
individuals are more interested in signals from their immediate social
network than in signals generated by global systems. Social networks
may differ in terms of their perception of what is a legitimate or
desirable site. For example, few who shop at Prada are likely to
embrace Kmart's shoe sales; while few who buy shoes at Kmart will
find Prada's pricing reasonable.
Quality does not need to be a global property, as long as it has a
local meaning inside a given segment of the social network.
Additionally, many commercial questions have local answers, none of
which would be globally correct. "Where can I buy good shoes?"
"Where is a good place to eat?" or "Who sells the best window
treatments?" each have a multitude of locally correct answers, but only
the answer that is specific to the location of the question's asker is
desired. Other questions have only partisan answers. For example,
conservative web sites might publish a range of truths and imaginative
falsehoods about liberals, which would be accepted uncritically by
some social networks and completely rejected by others. Similarly,
there are a wide range of religious web sites and anti-religious web
sites, both of which no authority could rank to the satisfaction of all
people.
It has been demonstrated that the presence of a small, persistent
application dedicated to a specific purpose will raise user awareness
and consciousness about that concept, even if use of the particular
27 Sergio Marti, Prasanna Ganesan, and Hector Garcia-Molina, "DHT Routing Using Social
Links" (workshop, Peer-to-Peer Systems, San Diego, CA, February 26-27, 2004)
http://dbpubs.stanford.edu:8090/pub/showDoc.Fulltext?lang=en&doc=2004-
4&format=pdf&compression=&name=2004-4.pdf.
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application is minimal. 28 This echoes the finding that suggests security
information and investment are complements.29
The Net Trust system was designed first and foremost to address
malicious, fraudulent and masquerade web sites. The basic model,
however, is extensible. Net Trust incorporates implicit behavior-
driven ratings, explicit individual recommendations and personally
selected trusted parties. Conceptually, this user model would be useful
for any resource of unknown quality when the resource quality is
static. That is, a bad resource cannot strategically behave as a good
resource some fraction of the time. For implicit information to work,
the distribution of resources must not be independent of the
distribution of users across the system. That is, for Net Trust to work,
users in a self-selected social network should be more alike than a
random group of strangers. In fact, the correlation between the web
sites visited by participants in a social network does not have to be
large if certain assumptions are made about the social network
structure.
There are many situations in which the conditions listed in the
previous paragraph (about bad actors and social networks) do hold.
Sharing with trusted social contacts is superior to sharing with a group
of strangers. With the inclusion of an implicit rating, social network-
driven recommender systems could be used to address the additional
generic quality problems. For example, interdisciplinary researchers
cannot reliably ascertain which research journals are superior in fields
that are not their disciplinary home. Net Trust can be used to track
either the publishing or the reading habits of an academic peer group,
allowing each member to gauge the relative importance of a journal
based on its readership. Net Trust may add value beyond mere
indication of phishing sites. That is, it may be enjoyable to use even by
people who are never phished. That increased value will make Net
Trust more usable since it will be perceived as worthwhile and more
frequently used. Thus, Net Trust will provide more detailed
information during browsing.
Peer production could enable production levels that cannot be
achieved with centralized capital. The context information that can be
28 Lorrie Faith Cranor, Manjula Aijula and Praveen Guduru, "Use of a P3P User Agent by
Early Adopters," in Proceedings of the ACM Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society
(New York, NY: ACM, 2002): 1-10.
29 Esther Gal-Or and Anindya Ghose, "The Economic Incentives for Sharing Security
Information," Information Systems Research 16, no. 2 (2005): 186-208.
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re-embedded by constraining production to known, trusted and similar
people in a social network is very powerful.
V. INTEGRATING PRIVACY-ENHANCED SIGNALING INTO BROWSING
The previous sections described the goals and motivation of Net
Trust and presented a theoretical argument for obtaining information
about peers to inform browsing. The actual mechanisms of Net Trust
are described in this section.
Net Trust is a highly distributed, user-centered, usable trust
management architecture that is resistant to spoofing, sybil attacks,
30
and web scripting.31  Net Trust is a toolbar based interface.
Eventually, Net Trust will support a p2p back end. Currently, Net
Trust has a thick client and a thin server.32  The client stores data,
anonymizes data, calculates reputations from the social network, and
manages the social network (e.g., confirming the relationship to an
email address and a Net Trust identifier). The client authenticates data
from third parties. User interaction is required to define the social
network and make optional comments. Ratings are generated from
observed user behavior, and then made pseudonymous for server-
based distribution. The server authenticates this pseudonymous
information when the data are written to the centralized server, then
stores and distributes it.
Some toolbars target specific threats like phishing. Spoofguard is
one of the toolbars that use the real-time characteristics of the phishing
sites themselves; for example, links, images, lack of a SSL certificate,
or misdirection in the links. Other toolbars are not designed to provide
contextual or socially meaningful information. In other toolbars, the
variables used to evaluate "trustworthiness" are under the control of
30 A sybil attack occurs when one malicious party obtains many identifiers or accounts and
then uses each to rate the others highly. For example, before eBay had a credit card
requirement, it was possible to form hundreds of accounts, run fake auctions then each fake
winner would rate the seller highly. After obtaining high ratings, real auctions were held by
malicious but highly-rated merchants.
31 Web scripting attacks occur when a web site appears to perform actions on behalf of the
user. For example, a web site may include a command (e.g., script) to repeatedly search a
term on Google, select a competitor's ad, and thus drive up the competitor's advertising cost to
Google without providing the corresponding visitors. Obviously Google also has strong
scripting detection; nonetheless attempts are made.
32 Thick and thin refer to functionality. A thick client does many tasks and is complicated,
while a thin server does little.
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the malicious agent. In contrast, Net Trust uses features that are not
under the control of the malicious agent: the user's social network, the
user's browsing history and the browsing histories of the user's social
network. In addition, the Net Trust toolbar takes advantage of a
unique characteristic of phishing sites to prevent one phishing victim
from misdirecting others: the temporal history of phishing sites.
Phishing sites go up, are identified, and are taken down over a short
period of time. Net Trust integrates the impermanence of phishing
sites into its reputation system.
Net Trust appears to the user as a toolbar plug-in for a web
browser. The toolbar is the main source of information to the user.
The application has five primary components: the social network, the
reputation system, the third parties, the interface, and the data
distribution network. Recall Figures 1, 2, and 3. These illustrate how
Net Trust in its current instantiation appears on various web sites: a
technical gossip site, a bank, and an auction site with a reputation
mechanism that privileges merchants over customers.
The following Figures provide a close-up of the two sources of
information available for the individual. Figure 6 shows the peer
ratings while Figures 7 and 8 show the only possible centralized
ratings.
Figure 6: Peer ratings
FaMi-1E..1 *EHHH
Figure 7: A positive centralized rating
Figure 8: A negative centralized rating
As shown in Figure 6, Net Trust integrates social network
information. Individuals may have multiple social networks: home,
family, hobby, political, or religious. Regardless of the level of
overlap, information from one social network may be inappropriate for
another social network. Not only do people share different
information with different people, but also different social networks
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are associated with different levels of trust.33  For example,
professional colleagues can have much to offer in terms of the
evaluation of professional web sites, but professional interactions are
not characterized by the same level of openness as family; professional
networks are not systematically used to request intimate or religious
information. Because of these differences, overlapping contexts can
cause a breach in privacy.
In order to support the construction of boundaries between a
person's varying roles, the application allows a user to have multiple
identities (e.g., pseudonyms) coupled with the individual's multiple
social networks. Pseudonyms engage in different social networks and
members of that social network are called "buddies." This is intended
to indicate the similarity to other online connections and to indicate
that the standard for inclusion may vary. "Buddy" is also sufficiently
vague to communicate that there is no standard for strength of the
network tie. The social network indicator as seen by the individual is
shown in Figure 9.
Figure 9: jean@work is distinct from ljean@play or ljean@home
. r n a . . n gr .
When a user leaves or clicks out of a web site, the URL is
associated with the pseudonyms visible in the toolbar. Choosing to
associate a site upon departure instead of arrival allows users to make
informed selections of web sites. Once a web site has been identified
as associated with a pseudonym (in the figure shown, the pseudonym
is "jean@work"), the user no longer has to select that identity when
visiting the associated web site. If jean is in work mode, and then
visits a site she has previously identified as associated with the
jean@home pseudonym, Net Trust will change pseudonyms at the
site. Therefore, after a web site has been associated with a
pseudonym, all future visits correspond to that pseudonym, regardless
of the web site selection at the time of site entry. Thus, individuals
have to make pseudonym choices only on new web sites. Presumably,
individuals will select a default pseudonym. Then they can possibly
select different pseudonyms for different machines, like those at their
work or home.
33 Judith Donath and Danah Boyd, "Public Displays of Connection," BT Technology Journal
22, no. 4 (2004): 71-82.
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VI. THE BUDDY LIST
An essential component of this application is the re-embedding of
a user's existing social network into his or her online browsing
experience. In brick and mortar commerce, physical location is
inherently associated with the social network, as exemplified by the
comer store, or by regulars at businesses and local meeting places.
Net Trust uses social networks to capture virtual locality information
in a manner analogous to physical information. Net Trust implements
social networks by requiring explicit interaction of the user. The Net
Trust user creates a "buddy list" containing the social network
associated with a pseudonym. Using the Net Trust invitation
mechanism, a user sends a request to a buddy asking for authorization
to add them to the user's buddy list.
Once the buddy approves the request, the user can place the buddy
in the social network defined by the appropriate pseudonym. Social
networks can be presented for user consideration from importing
Internet Messaging (IM) lists, email sent lists, or pre-existing social
network tools such as MySpace, Orkut, Friendster, Facebook or
LinkedIn. Net Trust requires that the individual issuing the invitation
to his or her buddy know the email or IM name of that buddy. The
invitation includes file location information that must be integrated
into the distributed file system. The following description identifies a
file name as the minimal adequate locator.
Consider a Net Trust user named Alice who has an associate
named Bob. Unlike standard cryptographic protocol descriptions, we
assume that Bob and Alice have established a virtual social history.
Before inviting anyone to a network, Alice creates a pseudonym.
Once the pseudonym is created, she creates a set of asymmetric keys,
both public and private. For simplicity, call the pseudonym
Alice@work. The private key allows Alice to confirm that any
message from Alice@work came from Alice@work to anyone with
the corresponding public key. Alice sends an invitation with a nonce
to Bob. A nonce prevents replay attacks and ensures freshness. The
public key prevents anyone else from associating themselves with
Alice's pseudonyms after the initial introduction. The public key is
not published.
The example can only continue if Bob agrees to join the system.
When Bob joins the system, Alice will share Alice@work's history
with Bob's chosen pseudonym. The history-based reputation
information is contained in a file or feed that is identified by a 128-bit
random number. The feed or file will not include personally
identifiable information. Since Alice initiated the invitation, she sends
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Bob her file locator and a key used to sign the file. Then Bob will
send his file locator and a key used to sign his feed. Part of Bob's
choice includes filling out information about his affiliation with Alice,
her name and his corresponding pseudonym, as well as a review date
for her inclusion. Thus, interaction is designed to cause some
cognitive dissonance when joining a stranger's network by demanding
unknown information in order to consummate the introduction.
Indeed, social network sizes are fixed so that position in someone's
social network has value. If social networks were expandable to the
thousands, then choosing to join someone's network would be the
default. Limiting the number of possible participants in a pseudonym
is designed to decrease the likelihood that a stranger will be able to
join. After distribution of Net Trust, we hope to implement
experiments to test how likely Net Trust users are to accept a stranger
to their social networks.
After this introduction, Alice and Bob update each other's own
local reputation-based signals by sending out information. Alice and
Bob update their own ratings by periodically downloading each other's
published files. The files, designated "filename," include URLs,
ratings and dates. Bob's ratings are then integrated into Alice's toolbar
as Bob's opinions of sites. Using the data distribution system, Alice's
client can read Bob's ratings and display them to Alice. Similarly,
Bob's client can read Alice's ratings.
34
In the proposed initial instantiation of Net Trust, different
individuals' opinions are not to be weighed differently. Segregating
individuals into social networks creates implicit weighting. Some
systems assume that individuals should be provided with different trust
weights because some contribute more than others.35 In contrast, our
system allows the user to evaluate his or her context based on the
provision of the information. While the proverbial grandparent might
not be as apt to discriminate between legitimate and malicious sites as
a computer savvy co-worker, she may have extensive knowledge of
hunger-based charities from volunteer work or detailed knowledge of
travel locales from personal experience. Therefore, our initial design
asserts that there is no single trust weight for an individual across all
contexts.
34 The importance of traffic analysis underscores the use of Tor in this system. Tor can
prevent traffic analysis.
35 Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson and Paul Syverson, "Reputation in P2P Anonymity
Systems" (Workshop on Economics of p2p Systems, Berkeley, CA, June 5-6, 2003)
http://freehaven.net/anonbib/cache/rep-anon.pdf.
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Figure 10: Net Trust View
By simply hitting the icon of two people between the left, green,
and right, red, rating bars, the user will see an enlarged view of their
social network and pertinent browsing statistics. User-selected icons
are displayed for ease of identification and personalization. Net Trust
also allows for the addition of third parties who make assertions about
trust as shown in the toolbar above. Centralized trusted parties provide
these ratings. They are called "broadcasters" in this model to
emphasize that they distribute but do not collect information.
While buddies share information by both sending information and
obtaining regular updates, broadcasters only distribute information.
Broadcasters use a certificate-based system to distribute their own files
with Boolean ratings. Such lists of "good" and "bad" sites are
sometimes called white and black lists or green and red lists. These
lists are stored and searched locally to prevent the need for the Net
Trust user to send queries that indicate their browsing habits.
Requiring a web query for searching would create a record of the
client's travels across the web, as with Page Rank records on the
Google toolbar and the Microsoft anti-phishing toolbar. Broadcasters'
ratings are shown as positive with a happy face, negative with a
"yuck" face, and no opinion as blank.
Early user tests found that signals less blunt than smiling and
"yucking" faces were confusing.36 The default on a URL that is not
included in the ratings provided by the broadcaster is to have nothing
displayed. Net Trust users will be able to select their own
broadcasters. To mitigate any possible harm, there is a maximum
lifetime for any green list. Broadcasters can be removed but it is not
possible for an attacker to replace one broadcaster with another even if
the first one has been removed. Overriding that feature requires that
an attacker have write permission on a user's drive. At that point, user
trust of web sites becomes a negligible measure of security. Since the
36 "Net Trust: A Cure for the Phishing Social Disorder," Phishing (Berlin, Germany: Springer,
2006).
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broadcasters provide important information, like any other trust vector,
subversion of that trust can cause harm. However, since broadcasters
only inform trust decisions, the harm is limited. If a broadcaster
provides bad information, the source can be detected by the user.
Compare this with ActiveX or the addition of trusted certificate
authorities which alter authorization and then access on the user's
machine. With ActiveX or other certificate-based systems, malicious
action from code cannot be observed during regular use by the user.
The security of this system depends on the ability of the user to
identify network participants' reliability and to prevent leakage of the
key used to share history. If attackers can rewrite histories, the system
is a net loss in security terms. There is no universal identity
infrastructure on which this system can depend. Invitations are issued
by email, and email-based identity authentication is arguably tenuous.
Social viruses have long utilized the lack of authentication in email to
increase the likelihood of victims taking the necessary action to launch
the virus. However, by requiring the response, this mechanism cannot
be subverted by mere deception in the "from" field.
The security design was based more on economic rather than
traditional security. The Net Trust system as modeled, which relies
upon economics assumptions, will create value for users and increase
the difficulty of certain types of financially motivated attacks. The
next section describes the reputation system.
VII. THE REPUTATION SYSTEM
The current reputation system has been subject to extensive agent
modeling and was constructed based upon the results of this system
modeling. An initial visit will log the web site in to the system on the
basis of domain names. This will create an initial rating of "one."
That rating will decay uniformly so that if the site is not visited again
the rating decreases to 0.5. Each time the web site is visited the rating
will double to a maximum of n. Currently, n is set to ten. When a site
is rated explicitly the explicit rating will remain without decay. Only
explicit user action can change a rating based on previous explicit user
action. In the case of a negative rating, the social network window
shows a large red bar connecting the user to the site. The lowest
implicit rating is zero.
For each web site that is associated with a pseudonym there are
one of two possible records. There will either be an explicit rating and
the URL, or the information required to calculate an implicit rating and
a URL. Current phishing statistics suggest a value of delay time
before an initial rating is entered of not less than twenty-four hours;
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however, this may change over time. One system design question is
whether users should be able to easily alter this delay time. Should the
system be designed to allow an easy update if a new attack with a
greater temporal signature is needed? If the value of the delay time is
too low then attack sites could change victims to supporters too
quickly. Thus, being able to increase the value offers the opportunity
for a more secure mechanism. However, the value to altering the
delay time can itself become a security risk because a phisher could
convince users to set the delay time at zero.
To summarize the reputation system, a single visit yields the initial
rating of one after some delay. The delay time prevents those who are
phished early from becoming agents of infection and supporting future
phishing attacks. Then, as the number of visits increases, the score
itself increases in value. The lowest value for a visited site that has not
been manually rated is zero. The greatest reputation value for any site
is five. The least reputation value of any site is negative five.
Negative ratings can only be generated by explicit user ratings, while
positive user ratings are generated by individual browsing habits.
Consider a phishing web site which broadcasters label "bad" or
"neutral." No member of the social network will have ever visited the
site. While this may not deter someone from entering a site to shop for
something unusual, it is an extremely unlikely outcome for a local
bank, PayPal, or eBay. For example, it is not surprising if no one you
know has visited www.piratemod.com/ unless one of your friends
loves pirate gear. On the other hand, there should be positive ratings
and history for PayPal or eBay. In order to increase the efficacy of the
toolbar against phishing in particular, one element of the project
entails bootstrapping all banking sites. Those web sites that are
operated by FDIC-insured entities are identified by a positive signal (a
smiley face). Those web sites that are not FDIC institutions are
identified by a negative signal (a "yuck" face). The icons are shown
and described in the previous section.
In addition, bootstrapping information can be provided by a
compendium of shared bookmarks such as Give-A-Link or
SiteAdvisor. PhishGuard generates a list of phishing sites and could
be integrated into Net Trust. PhishGuard uses peer production of
information by asking people to submit phishing sites but provides no
privacy or other feedback. The FDIC, if it were the sole default
broadcaster, would label any phishing site "not a bank." Without the
inclusion of a FDIC listing, the Net Trust toolbar has a failure similar
to many security mechanisms in that the user is forced to look for what
is not there. Seals function only if they are noted both when they are
present and when they are missing. The lock icon on SSL is replaced
with a red icon but the user must notice that the lock is missing.
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Providing only positive information and demanding that individual
notice is missing is not as effective as providing both positive and
negative information. However, few merchants and no criminals will
provide negative information about themselves on a web site or in an
email. In email, eBay messages include a header that indicates only
messages with the eBay header are to be trusted. Obviously fake
emails from criminals do not comply by including a flag to indicate
that the expected eBay header is missing. Trust seals are easy to copy.
It is apparent, valid economic signals for resource identification on the
web are missing.
The long-term efficacy of the reputation system depends upon how
similar social networks are in terms of browsing. Do friends visit the
same web sites? Do coworkers visit the same web sites? For example,
in the most general reputation system every user has a chance of
seeing any one page. If there is a probability, p, that a user will
correctly judge that a resource is bad, and the probability that the user
the corresponding probability that the user would mislabel the source
is l-p, therefore a decision rule could be easily derived. This type of
information is not currently available either for small social networks
or available generally. If the user has a probability of p, to correctly
judge a bad resource, and would mislabel it with the corresponding
probability l-p, a decision rule could be derived trivially. However,
that information is not only unavailable for small social networks but
also it is generally unavailable. For this type of research to be
conducted Net Trust must be completed and have a group of users.
Using this reputation system with the assumption of different
degrees of homophily,37 the user modeling as described above
indicates that Net Trust would provide a high degree of value in
identification and annotation of web sites. Given that the ideal
mechanism cannot be known because social network homophily is not
known, the implementation is based on user modeling. Recall that
user modeling indicates Net Trust will significantly increase the ability
of end users to discriminate between resource types, e.g., good or bad.
The model demonstrates that the inclusion of bootstrapping
information will dramatically increase the ability of end users to
discriminate accurately. Bootstrapping is providing by importing
histories and adding third parties, i.e., the FDIC. The modeling of the
reputation system indicates that the system - as proposed - will be
37 Homophily means that people who are in a social network have similar browsing habits.
Users are not uniformly distributed across the low-traffic sites on the web. Some sites of are
interest only to a small population, such as members of a course at a university or members of
one school or office.
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valuable that assists users when they are distinguishing between safe
and unsafe resources.
VIII. USABILITY STUDY RESULTS
Net Trust is only useful to the extent that it is usable. For this
reason, Net Trust began with user testing. Twenty-five Indiana
University graduate and undergraduate students participated in the first
usability study of Net Trust, and fifty students participated in the
second. The students were from the School of Informatics. Initially,
the participants of the usability study were asked to spend a few
minutes investigating three web sites. The web sites were fabricated,
especially for the purpose of a usability study, and controlled for
content and interface.3  The participants were asked to indicate if they
would trust the sites with their personal identifiable information,
including some financial information. In the first test, the toolbar was
enabled in the browser and the participants were instructed to visit
each of the three web sites again and complete one toolbar task on
each site. The tasks included rating a site, adding and removing
buddies, and switching between buddy and network view. The survey
had been previously validated with two tests of undergraduates. For
the Net Trust usability test, the toolbars were seeded with reputation
information. In the second test, users were separated into those with
and without the toolbars.
After examining the web sites, the participants were prompted to
indicate their trust of the three web sites by taking into account the
information provided by the toolbar. For the first two web sites, the
toolbar showed a large number of "buddies" visiting the site, six out of
ten for web site one, and eight out of ten for web site two, respectively,
as well as positive or neutral ratings for the broadcasters. The last web
site displayed only two out of ten friends visiting the site, and negative
or neutral rating from the broadcasters. The toolbar significantly
increased the propensity to trust a web site. The results demonstrate
that the toolbar is successful in providing a signal of trust towards a
web site. Even when the toolbar displayed a significant amount of
38 Alla Genkina, "Re-Embedding Existing Social Networks into Online Experiences to Aid in
Trust Assessment," (master's thesis, University of Indiana, School of Informatics).
39 The similarity of the three web sites was tested at Loyola Marymount before the Net Trust
experiments. L. Jean Camp, Cathleen McGrath, and Alla Genkina, "Security and Morality: A
Tale of User Deceit" (lecture, Models of Trust for the Web, Edinburgh, Scotland, May 22,
2006) http://www.ljean.com/files/ WWW06camp.pdf.
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negative ratings, as in web site three, the fact that a web site had been
previously visited by members of a social network increased the
propensity to trust. This finding is validated by my examination of
trust mechanisms for which I argued that social networks are a
powerful mechanism for enabling trust.
IX. PRIVACY CONSIDERATIONS AND ANONYMITY MODELS
The critical observation of the privacy that Net Trust - as it is
proposed here - provides is the fact that the end user has control over
his or her own information. Privacy can be violated when a user
makes a poor decision to share information. However, the system does
not concentrate data nor does it compel disclosure. There is a default
pseudonym in the system that is shared with no other party (private)
and another that collects no information at all (logout).
Net Trust is designed to ensure privacy in that the users can share
selected information while controlling with whom they share
information. This system shares web browsing information in a closed
network of peers. In contrast, consider Furl and Del.icio.us. Both are
designed to leverage the observation that each user has a unique view
of the web informed by their own history and the history of others. In
both systems there is significant centralized storage of user browsing
and no explicit mechanism for user pseudonyms. Neither of these
systems uses the developments in social network systems beyond
simple collaborative filtering. Individuals do not select their own peer
groups. As a result, information can be inappropriate and in some
cases data are highly polarized. For example, a search for "George W.
Bush" on Del.icio.us yields images of both the President and of
various chimpanzees. Del.icio.us and Furl do have a commonality
with Net Trust in that they both integrate peer-produced information.
Net Trust also differs from other social browsing mechanisms in that
identity is not intended to be universal. There can be many "Bobs" so
long as there is only one "Bob" in any particular social network.
Effectively, identities are used as handles or buddy names to create a
virtual implementation of a pre-existing social network. Identity
construction assumes a previous context, so that meaning is derived
from the name and context. Each person can construct as many
pseudonyms as he or she desires, where each pseudonym corresponds
to a distinct user-selected social network.
Net Trust is designed to have three default pseudonyms:
user@home, user@work and private. Web sites visited under the
private pseudonym are never distributed in the Net Trust data
structures. There is an argument for keeping a "private" list stored.
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The advantage is that users can inform their own personal browsing.
The disadvantage is that the user may want nothing recorded. Our
solution is to have a private pseudonym and an option to logout from
the system. "Logout" is not considered a pseudonym. In all cases, if a
user is logged in under a certain pseudonym, his or her web site
activity will only be shared with the social network associated with
that pseudonym and not with any other networks that might exist
under different pseudonyms. The user may also edit by hand the list of
sites that are shared with any particular social network.
Subsequently, a user's online activity is only used to inform the
buddy view in other buddies' handpicked views. Becoming and
offering oneself as a broadcaster requires downloading additional
software and publishing a public key. The interface for broadcasters in
our design accepts only single entry URLs and requires notations for
each URL entered. Our design is directed at preventing anyone from
becoming a broadcaster by accident. There is no implicit rating
mechanism for broadcasters.
X. CONCLUSIONS
In general, privacy and security markets suffer from a lack of
signaling. This decreases the overall demand for privacy and security
information and products, as neither is necessarily trustworthy. One
reason for the lack of reliable signaling is the economic incentive for
producers of trusted information to sell that information. In an
adaptation of Gresham's law, bad security can drive out good security
when both demand the same price.40  Indeed, high levels of Internet
fraud make individuals less likely to interact with trustworthy sites. A
daily usable version of Net Trust can be found linked at
http://www.ljean.com/NetTrust/. 4 1
40 According to Encyclopdia Britannica, it is named for Sir Thomas Gresham (1519-1579),
financial agent of Queen Elizabeth I, who was one of the first to elucidate it: "if two coins
have the same face value but are made from metals of unequal value, the cheaper will tend to
drive the other out of circulation; the more valuable coin will be hoarded or used for foreign
exchange instead of for domestic transactions." Similarly, if there are cheap and unreliable
security mechanisms which cannot be distinguished from expensive and reliable security
mechanisms, all merchants will be pushed to adopt the cheap, unreliable security measures.
Encyclopedia Britannica, online ed., s.v. "Gresham's law" (accessed November 20, 2007).
41 Net Trust code for developed is currently available at http://code.google.coml.
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